

Toward Metrics for Differentiating Out-of-Distribution Sets

M. Abbasi¹; C. Shui¹; A. Rajabi²; C. Gagné^{1,3}; R. Bobba²

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


1. IID, Université Laval, Québec, Canada
2. Oregon State University, Corvallis, USA
3. Mila, Canada CIFAR AI Chair

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Out-of-Distribution (OOD): a risk for vanilla CNNs

- ▶ **Unreliable** models (e.g. vanilla CNNs) are uncalibrated:
 - High confidence for most samples, drawn from any data distributions.



A vanilla MLP classifies the entire input space into two classes.

- ▶ **Reliable CNNs** are calibrated:
 - High confidence on in-distribution samples but low confidence predictions for out-of-distribution ones.

How to detect OOD samples?

End-to-end models by OOD learning; a promising avenue to detect OOD samples:

1. **Explicitly** train a vanilla CNN to output calibrated prediction on OOD samples, then use a **threshold** on the calibrated predictions for detecting OOD samples [1]–[3].
2. **Explicitly** train an Augmented CNN (A-CNN) – a vanilla CNN with an extra class added to its output – with an extra class to assign OOD samples. [*threshold-free*]

An unaddressed central question in OOD learning



Research question

Among several OOD sets available, how can one identify the most appropriate set for training a calibrated CNN with high detection rate over **unseen OOD samples?**

Previous methods selected an OOD set manually, without a rigorous justification for their selection.

Our proposal: protective OOD set

- ▶ We characterize OOD sets with their **level of protection** of the in-distribution sub-manifolds.
 - How well an OOD set can cover all in-distribution sub-manifolds.



Our metrics for measuring protection level

I) **Softmax-based Entropy**

II) **Coverage Ratio**

III) **Coverage Distance**

Notation:


- ▶ $\mathcal{S}_O = \{\mathbf{x}_O^j\}_{j=1}^M$: OOD set of M samples
- ▶ $\mathcal{S}_I = \{\mathbf{x}_I^i\}_{i=1}^N$: in-distribution training set of N samples
- ▶ $h(\cdot)$: a pre-trained vanilla CNN trained on \mathcal{S}_I

I) Softmax-based Entropy (SE)

Goal: measure how uniformly the OOD samples \mathcal{S}_O are distributed to the in-distribution sub-manifolds.

$$H(\mathcal{S}_O) = - \sum_{k=1}^K p(c = k | \mathcal{S}_O) \log p(c = k | \mathcal{S}_O).$$

$p(c = k | \mathcal{S}_O)$: the ratio of OOD samples classified as k -th class by the vanilla h .




(a) **Small SE:** OOD samples collapse to one manifold.

(b) **Large SE:** OOD samples uniformly distributed over all manifolds

II) Coverage Ratio (CR)

Goal: measuring coverage of the sub-manifolds by the OOD samples.


| Adjacency matrices | Coverage Ratio (CR) |
|--|---|
| \mathbf{z}_I^j : in-dist.; \mathbf{z}_O^j : out-dist; both in feature space | |
| $W_{i,j} = \begin{cases} \ \mathbf{z}_I^i - \mathbf{z}_O^j\ _2 & \text{if } \mathbf{z}_I^i \in \text{k-NN}(\mathbf{z}_O^j, S_I) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ | $R(S_I, S_O) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{I} \left(\sum_{j=1}^M (A_{i,j}) > 0 \right)$ |
| $A_{i,j} = \mathbb{I}(W_{i,j} > 0)$ | |



III) Coverage Distance (CD)

Goal: measuring the average distance between an OOD set S_O and the in-distribution sub-manifolds

$$D(S_I, S_O) = \frac{\sum_{i,j} W_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j} A_{ij}} = \frac{1}{kM} \sum_{i,j} W_{ij}.$$



- ▶ A protective OOD set has a **high softmax-based Entropy (SE)** and **Coverage Ratio (CR)**
- ▶ Preferably, it also has a small coverage distance, placing near to the in-distribution sub-manifolds

▶ **Image classification**

- In-distribution: SVHN and CIFAR-10
- Natural OOD sets: LSUN, ISUN, CIFAR-100 and TinyImageNet
- Synthetic OOD set: Gaussian noise

▶ **Sound classification**

- In-distribution: Urban Sound
- Natural OOD sets: TuT, Google Command, and ECS
- Synthetic OOD set: White noise



Assessment of our metrics by A-CNNs

Metrics assessment approach:

1. Identify the most protective OOD set w.r.t an in-distribution task
2. Show that an A-CNN trained on **most protective** OOD set has a **high average detection rate** on unseen OOD sets
3. Show that an A-CNN trained on the **least protective** OOD sets has a **low average detection rate** on unseen OOD sets


Assessment of our metrics (A-CNNs): SVHN

- ▶ **Most protective OOD set:** CIFAR-100 (highest SE and CR)
- ▶ **Least protective:** ISUN and Gaussian noise



Assessment of our metrics (A-CNN): CIFAR-10



- ▶ **Most protective OOD set:** C100*¹ (highest SE and CR)
- ▶ **Least protective:** SVHN and Gaussian noise



¹C100* is the modified C100 by removing its classes that have an overlap with those of C10.

Assessment of our metrics (A-CNN): Urban Sound

- ▶ **Most protective OOD set:** ECS (highest SE and CR)
- ▶ **Least protective:** Command, TuT, and white noise (due to their very low SE)




Assessment of metrics: explicitly-calibrated CNNs

Likewise A-CNNs, **the most protective OOD set** induces to an explicitly-calibrated CNN with **higher average AUROC** and **lower average False Positive Rate (FPR) @95% TPR**.


| In-distribution | Training OOD set | Test OOD sets |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|--|
| | | Avg AUROC(\uparrow) / AvgFPR(\downarrow) |
| SVHN | ISUN \ddagger | 94.73 / 31.97 |
| | LSUN | 99.25 / 4.39 |
| | C10 | 99.75 / 0.41 |
| | T-ImgNt | 99.75 / 1.10 |
| | C100* | 99.86 / 0.07 |
| CIFAR-10 | SVHN \ddagger | 86.38 / 75.04 |
| | ISUN | 86.20 / 77.03 |
| | LSUN | 93.31 / 38.59 |
| | T-ImgNt | 93.89 / 34.44 |
| | C100*\star | 93.03 / 26.13 |
| Urban-Sound | Command \ddagger | 59.15 / 63.06 |
| | TuT \ddagger | 45.40 / 85.08 |
| | ECS* | 71.41 / 60.67 |

FGS adversaries rejection


- ▶ SVHN adversarial examples
- ▶ A-CNN^{*}: trained on the most protective OOD set.
- ▶ A-CNN[‡]: trained on the least protective OOD set.



(a) (blue line) CD of SVHN adversaries;
(red dotted line) CD of C100 as an OOD*





(b) Err. rate = 1-(Acc. + Rej.)



FGS adversaries rejection (cont.)

CIFAR-10 adversarial examples



α (noise magnitude)

α (noise magnitude)






$\epsilon = 0.02$

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1



Conclusion

- ▶ OOD sets are not equivalent for training a well-generalized A-CNN and explicitly-calibrated CNN with **high OOD detection rate**
- ▶ The **protection level is a valid property** to guide selection of an appropriate OOD set
- ▶ **Our Metrics** can successfully reveal the most protective OOD set.

Thanks for your attention

Q&A

Link to our paper: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.08650>



mahdiah.abbasi.1@ulaval.ca



christian.gagne@gel.ulaval.ca



changjian.shui.1@ulaval.ca



rajabia@oregonstate.edu



rakesh.bobba@oregonstate.edu

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- [2] D. Hendrycks, M. Mazeika, and T. G. Dietterich, “Deep anomaly detection with outlier exposure,” *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2019.
- [3] K. Lee, H. Lee, K. Lee, and J. Shin, “Training confidence-calibrated classifiers for detecting out-of-distribution samples,” *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*, 2017.